Introduction
The hidden threat of decentralization:
Can Canada survive a steady loss of power?

Decentralization. The word alone is enough to make one's eyes gloss over - but that would be a mistake. A very costly mistake.

Canadians - via successive federal governments - have been sleepwalking into a looming catastrophy of decentralization.

Outnumbered 10 to one by provincial governments, federal government after federal government has tried to make peace with the provinces, often by ceding various federal powers to them. That, in a nutshell, is how decentralization happens: The central (federal) government decentralizes power by giving powers to the provinces.

How is decentralization a threat to Canada? To put it blunty: Why should we care?

At a glance, decentralization doesn't appear to be a threat at all. It may even give the appearance of being a good thing. After all, many Canadians in our huge country feel isolated from Ottawa.

These Canadians are physically, perhaps even emotionally, closer to their provincial government. This is true even for many people in Ontario and Quebec. It is more likely to be true for people living in other provincies who have far more geography between themselves and Ottawa. Beyond the separation of land mass, there is a widely held belief provincial governments are closer in structure to being local governments and are more responsive to the needs of people in their given province.

Such feelings of closeness to one's province may be valid. Provincial governments may, in many matters, be more responsive than the federal government could ever hope to be.

Yet these assumptions - even if they're correct - are largely irrelvant when determining the threat of decentralization. They're irrelevant, because, when it comes to addressing many aspects of our day-to-day lives, the provinces have always been in control. Health care is a major concern for many Canadians. It's under the jurisdiction of the provinces. Education is also a provincial matter.

Even such mundane matters as local roads and sewers handled by municipal governments and school boards are provincial in nature: The municipalities and boards are creations of the provinces and are controlled by provincial governments. In short, the provinces can be as responsive as they want in matters within their own jursidiction and control.

However, many of these same Canadians - who remain convinced their provincial government is closer to them - also value a strong federal government.

Canadians want and expect their federal government to represent Canada and Canadian interests on the world stage. They want Canada to continue evolving as a country, as a nation state, and not as a loose collection of provinces. They turn to the federal government to protect our shared national interests and promote our nationality and our culture in times of peace and war.

Yet decentralization has proceeded at such an unchecked, disturbing rate that our federal government is at risk of becoming a hollow shell, so stripped of power as to be incapable of representing and guiding our country into a prosperous future.

This book addresses the rising threat of decentralization. It is hoped it will serve as a wake-up call for Canadians everywhere.

- Michael B. Davie.

Chapter 1:
The Move Towards Decentralization
Exploring the rise of provincial power

Sir John A. Macdonald's original 1867 vision was that of a highly-centralized Canada in which the federal government would provide nationhood, control over most economic matters and control over provincial governments which would play a secondary role administering local concerns.

In his view, Ottawa should take full advantage of its British North America Act powers over trade and commerce, defence, banking, taxation, and other measures deemed necessary to provide for peace, order and good government, including using federally-appointed provincial lieutenant-governors to disallow provincial legislation at odds with Ottawa. 1.

Canada's first prime minister clearly envisioned a Canada shaped by centralization, defined as that which has the centre as its focus, in which the power and authority is concentrated in a central organization (in Macdonald's vision: the federal government) and which plays a dominant role over non-central organizations. 2.

This view was, of course, opposite to decentralization, defined as that which breaks up a concentration of governmental power at the centre and distributes it more widely. 3.

This paper will show that, far from Sir John A Macdonald's preference for a clearly centralized federal nation, Canada has evolved into one of the most decentralized countries in the world.

As well, this paper will argue that, with the exception of a few brief and extraordinary, unifying moments in Canadian history, the ongoing shift towards decentralization has been virtually relentless.

Why Canada should find the force of decentralization so irresistible will be explored in this paper, with particular regard to the decentralizing influences of Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England and the JCPC-assisted growth in power of provincial governments.

First, it should be understood that Confederation itself , the uniting of the four former colonies of Canada West (Ontario), Canada East (Quebec), New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; and the initial centralist thrust of this union were, in some measure, all part of a unifying response to a perceived take-over threat from the United States in the 1860s, following the American Civil War. As R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones and Donald B. Smith suggest:

"Fear of an American take-over during the Civil War was perhaps the leading cause of Canadian confederation." 4.

Craig Brown notes that the American threat also provided some of the thrust for the post-Confederation National Policy to unite the provinces through a national railway which would open up the riches of the West and through tariffs which would secure the domestic market for Canadian companies while heading off American competition. As Brown notes:

"The United States played an interesting role in the National Policy that emphasized its nationalistic assumptions. Fundamental to the thinking of the framers of the policy was the idea that the United States was ... an aggressive competitor power waiting for a suitable opportunity to fulfil its destiny of the complete conquest of North America. The National Policy was intended to be the first line of defence against American ambitions." 5.

That Confederation also ended a political deadlock between the previously united Canadas is an indication that even pre-Confederation there existed jurisdictional tensions between former colonies and their unified government. 6.

Yet, initially, the federal government 's centralist thrust attracted many of the politically elite. As Roger Gibbons observes:

"In the early years after Confederation, the centralized federal system put into place by the Constitution Act of 1867 was reinforced by a massive migration of political talent to Ottawa. With the exception of Ontario's Oliver Mowat, whowent on to become the province's premier, all the politicians voting for Confederation opted for elected or appointed national office. For the political movers and shakers, the action was in Ottawa and not in the provinces." 7.

Soon after Confederation, a new jurisdictional debate began to rage over the extent of power which ought to be accorded to the federal government and provincial governments.

The weight behind centralist and decentralist arguments depended very much on how the British North America Act was interpreted - and which side was doing the interpreting. Capturing the essence of the centralist cause, Francis, Jones and Smith observe:

"Those who believe in the wide-ranging authority of the central government point out that the BNA Act delegated precise and very circumscribed powers to the provincial governments ... Centralists contend that the phrase "Peace, order and good government of Canada," and the phrase "regulation of trade and commerce, " incorporated all powers not exclusively given to the provinces, and therefore the residuum of powers lies with the federal government. Furthermore, the lieutenant governors of the provinces (all of whom were appointees of the dominion government) held the right to reserve and disallow provincial legislation." 8.

Yet, as Francis, Jones and Smith also note, supporters of decentralization have been able to put forth compelling arguments of their own:

"Advocates of provincial rights argue, in contrast, that as the colonial leaders themselves established the union, Confederation is a compact made between political jurisdictions. They also point to the general phrase "property and civil rights in the province," in section 92 or the BNA Act which deals with the constitutional rights of the provinces, as proof of the intent to give broad powers to the provinces. Furthermore, they note that the provinces were given a structure of government similar to that of the federal government, implying that the provinces has an association with the Crown similar, not subordinate, to that of the dominion." 9.

Macdonald's National policy and its inherent promise of opening up the western region of Canada to the business interests of central Canada helped draw support from Ontario and Quebec for centralism in the early years of federalism.

Yet, it wasn't long before Ontario and Quebec joined the hinterland provinces in challenging Macdonald's centralist vision. In particular, Quebec's unease with joining a larger, predominantly English-speaking society would make itself known.

As R. I. Cheffins and P.A. Johnson notes Quebec has long been interested in assuming "ownership and control of their economy." 10.

Garth Stevenson similarly emphasizes the pivotal role Quebec has played in the advancement of provincial powers when he notes:

"The demands for provincial legislative powers came mainly from the French Canadians, for whom the establishment of a Quebec legislature was the major attraction of Confederation. The powers which they demanded for that legislature were mainly related to social institutions, education, the family, and the legal system." 11.

Ontario too joined the province's push for decentralization early on.

Oliver Mowat, premier from 1872-1896, has been called the Father of Provincial Rights for his successful efforts to expand Ontario's provincial boundaries, have lieutenant governors appointed by the provinces (thus ending direct control by the federal government and the threat of disallowance of provincial legislation), and other legal rights. 12.

The cry for provincial powers was also heard in the west where the new provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta were deprived by the federal government of jurisdiction over natural resources despite the fact that the other provinces had these rights. It wasn't until 1930 that the western provinces were made equal to the others - and therefore more powerful than they had previously been - following decades of alienation and demands for fair treatment. 13.

A dregree of decentralization was the natural outcome of providing western provinces with the same powers accorded the other provinces.

As well, the Maritimes sought and received additional provincial powers to prevent them from becoming small and irrelevant parts of a much greater whole. In many ways, the provinces' push for decentralization arrived with the dawn of Confederation and simply gained momentum following 1867.

Opposition to Macdonald's version of a centralized federal system was vociferous from the former colonies turned provinces.

Francis, Jones and Smith note that "the Maritimes, Quebec, and in Ontario, the Clear Grits, had resisted at the time of Confederation the idea of a legislative union, or highly centralized government with very weak local governments." 14.

They add:

"Macdonald's Conservative government maintained that major power should reside in the federal government. In contrast, the provincial premiers (most often Liberals) argued that the provinces were the main source of power and that they had voluntarily delegated only a portion of it to a central government…" 15.

As if this united front for decentralization was not enough, the provinces had a powerful judicial body to turn to which was sympathetic to their calls for more power. As Francis, Jones and Smith observe, provincial governments bent on decentralization had a powerful ally in the JCPC:

"The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court in the British Empire, consistently in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries interpreted the constitution in favour of the provinces. This constitutional court believed that the BNA Act gave wide powers to the provinces." 16.

The JCPC was given a statutory basis by the Imperial Parliament in Britain to rule on jurisdictional disputes between the federal and provincial governments in Canada - generally on the basis of appeals from the provinces for greater powers.

As Garth Stevenson notes, Sir John A. Macdonald was to find that "the Judicial Committee's decisions were to play a decisive part in undermining his plans for a highly centralized federation." 17.

Through a number of provincial appeals, the JCPC came to enhance provincial powers at the expense of the federal government and its preference for centralism. Stevenson suggests the JCPC, led by Scottish Conservatives such as Lord Watson, may have applied the perspective of "a minority nation within a unity state," to the provinces in an effort to "maximize their powers in relation to the federal government." 18.

Whatever the driving force behind the JCPC's decisions, there was no mistaking the pro-provincial outcomes of landmark cases such as Hodge Vs the Queen in which the JCPC ruled provinces had the power to regulate liquor traffic within their boundaries and struck down a federal statute to issue liquor licences.

There were also the JCPC cases decided by Lord Watson that established the provinces as governments equal to the federal government. And there were the cases decided by Watson's successor and fellow Scotsman Viscount Haldane who struck down an array of federal legislation regarding everything from regulations for the insurance industry to an 18-year-old federal law to deal with labor disputes. 19.

All of these pro-provincial rights JCPC rulings were to have a profound and lasting impact on the shift towards decentralization of powers away from the federal government. As Stevenson observes:

"Appeals were not, in fact, abolished until 1949, with the result that for almost a century the most influential concepts of Canadian federalism were mainly defined by men who had no practical knowledge of Canada or of federalism, and who were not even required to live in that country. The Supreme Court of Canada ... increasingly deferred to the doctrines laid down by the JCPC." 20.

Thus far, we have seen that the shift towards decentralization came about by the relentless efforts of provinces to expand recognition of their powers and that the decentralizing thrust was aided in no small way by a number of key rulings by the JCPC.

Added to these factors is an array of contributing causes to decentralization, including the lessening of the perceived take-over threat from the U.S. which had initially provided a common crisis to unify Canada under a centralist banner.

Alan Cairns has found that, in retrospect, the forces aiding decentralization were irresistible and Canada's evolution into a more decentralized federal state has been inevitable:

"From the vantage point of a century of constitutional evolution, the centralist emphasis of the Confederation settlement appears increasingly unrealistic .... in the long run centralization was inappropriate for the regional diversities of a land of vast extent and a large, geographically concentrated, minority culture ..." 21.

He adds: "The existence of Quebec alone has been sufficient to prevent Canada from following the centralist route..." 22.

Indeed, it's possible that JCPC's pro-province judicial interpretations actually performed, to some degree, the helpful function of easing regional pressures from Quebec which might have become explosive. As former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau suggests:

"It has long been a custom in English Canada to denounce the Privy Council for its provincial bias; but it should perhaps be considered that if the law lords had not leaned in that direction, Quebec separation might not be a threat today: it might be an accomplished fact." 23.

Another factor behind the shift to decentralization has been the general tendency for many of Macdonald's successors to be less interested in a firmly centralized federal system and more interested in harmonious federal-provincial relations.

Macdonald's immediate successor, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, was the first prime minister to accept what would fast develop into a trend towards greater decentralization. His openness to greater provincial independence, at a time of relative prosperity, brought in a co-operative era in the 1890s. As Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson note:

"The economic successes of the wheat boom, corresponding roughly with the Laurier era, might have strengthened federal legitimacy and, with it, Macdonald's centralized quasi-federal ideals. But under Laurier, the federation had already decentralized considerably ... the principal moral was that political decentralization and economic growth were compatible." 24.

As well, partisan rivalry between Liberal provinces and the Conservative federal government fueled decentralization. So did the unforeseen powers that control over natural resources would give the provinces in the building of highways and hydro-electrical projects.

Also fuelling decentralization was the addition of new provinces and premiers to further outnumber the federal government.

Another factor prompting decentralization was the ongoing tendency to indulge in province-building, particularly Quebec which has continually sought greater provincial powers as a means of protecting its French Fact from assimilation into the rest of Canada.

Yet, just as Macdonald was able to rely on the perceived threat of war with the United States in the 1860s to achieve an initially centralist federal system, another national crisis, the First World War, would also aid in interrupting the decentralizing evolution of Canada.

Gibbons notes the war united English Canadians in a "collective national endeavour and, not coincidentally, ushered in a sustained period of national dominance within the federal system." 25.

However, Quebec's anti-conscription stance isolated that province while the other provinces simply put their differences and bids for more political power on hold during the war.

Once the war ended, the provinces quickly resumed their efforts to enhance their powers, introducing gasoline taxes and a variety of commercial licensing fees which added enormously to their ability to increase their wealth.

By the time the 1930s Great Depression hit, most provinces had achieved an historically high degree of independence, relying on the federal government for only 13 per cent of their revenues.

As Simeon and Robinson assert, "by 1929, a decentralized version of the classical model of federalism was firmly in place - sociologically, politically and constitutionally." 26.

The Great Depression provided another crisis which united Canadians in the common cause although the federal government took a cautious approach, possibly in deference to Quebec which argued strongly for increased decentralization to better enable the provincial government to deal with the depression.

Simeon and Robinson observe that "the federal government did not implement reforms on a scale equivalent to those of Roosevelt's New Deal - nor did Canadian federalism undergo the same process of centralization." 27.

The Second World War also united Canadians in the face of a common crisis and enhanced the federal government's powers as the central government began to play a far more expanded role in enlarging the welfare state to accommodate farm supplement and other social programs during the war-generated economic boom and virtual full employment. 28.

In the aftermath of the war, there was a political price to pay for going against Quebec's anti-conscription position. As Simeon and Robinson assert:

"... the Second World War exacerbated French-English conflicts, as had the First. It did not cost (Prime Minister Mackenzie) King power in Ottawa ... but it cost him the Liberal government of Quebec and, with it, any hope of dealing with a Quebec government open to centralizing constitutional ammendments." 29.

Richard Simeon notes that "the presence of Quebec, the preoccupation of the federal government with national unity in the face of a still regionalized society, and the difficulties of achieving constitutional change all meant that the federal framework remained intact - centralization proceeded less far in Canada than in a number of other countries." 30.

As F. R. Scott observes, "the advent of war in 1939 brought the "emergency" doctrine into play. Instantly provincial autonomy gave way, to the extent considered necessary by Ottawa to overcome the emergency." 31.

From 1945 through to about 1965, the 20-year , post-war period was also one of co-operative federalism in which the provinces continued to grow in strength as they were the administrators of numerous programs jointly financed by federal and provincial governments. This would mark perhaps the longest period in Canadian history of relative dominance by the federal government over the provinces. 32.

Central to this period was the post-war Keynesian Compromise based on the fiscal principles set out by the economist Keynes who advocated a central role for the state in spending - with deficits if necessary - during hard times, then building up surpluses during good times.

This era was also marked by a shift to continentalism, a closer integration of Canadian and American economies. All of this put the federal government in the commanding position of being able to use its income tax spending powers to become involved in numerous social programs. 33.

By 1957, John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservative government was advocating a pan-Canadian approach based on the concept of one nation and a blurring of provincial identities and disparities through national programs and equalization grants. 34.

But in the late 1960s, the Keynesian Compromise had been discredited through stagflation, the combination of high unemployment, high inflation and a stagnant economy. 35.

All of this left Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau struggling to retain a dominant role for the federal government through the imposition of several national programs.

Acting on another potentially-unifying crisis - the Energy Crisis of oil cartels and rapidly rising prices - Trudeau substantial federal power over the economy and the provinces through such measures as wage and price controls, the Foreign Investment Review Agency to screen corporate take-overs and the National Energy Program which took control of Alberta oil prices, driving them downwards for the benefit of eastern businesses and consumers. 36.

However, Trudeau's centralist approach was overturned by the Brian Mulroney Progressive Conservative government of the 1980s through early 1990s.

Mulroney replaced FIRA with Investment Canada which greatly reduced federal government control over foreign investment.

He also abandoned the controlled economy approach of Trudeau for the free market, perhaps best-illustrated by his government's hands-off approach to the economy and natural resources and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement which reduced the federal government's ability to intervene in the economy through subsidies or buy-Canadian policies.

In addition, Mulroney attempted - but failed - to enact two different constitutional accords - Meech Lake and Charlottetown - which would have succeeded in further decentralizing federal power to the provinces while recognizing Quebec as a distinct society.

Indeed, the Mulroney drift towards decentralization has been remarkable. As Janine Brody observes:

"The drama of politics in the past decade is, in many ways, a chronicle of how the Conservative party succeeded in forging new regional alliances in order to displace the Liberals and thereby realize their version of a decentralized, continentalist and market-driven economy." 37.

Quebec in particular has taken to exerting previously unseen provincial power. For example, the province's decision to invoke the notwithstanding clause in the Charter of Rights in order to overturn the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada that Quebec's Law 101 prohibiting the use of English on exterior store signs was an unconstitutional violation of the basic human right of freedom of expression. 38.

Indeed, Quebec continues to issue bids for the powers which would virtually establish it as a separate entity altogether. Ryszard Cholewinkski is among a number of political observers who anticipate the 1990s will yet see the "emergence of a new arrangement between Quebec and the rest of Canada ...based in some way on sovereignty-association." 39.

Meanwhile, Donald Smiley contends that the Mulrontey government drift towards decentralization has left the federal government weak and without a central focus:

"The price of such change ... has been a profound absence of national direction. Without such direction and without any coherent national vision articulated by the leadership of the federal parties, Canadian politics becomes little more than a 'scuffle of private interests'." 40.

Richard Simeon asserts that the federal government is increasingly finding it lacks sufficient powers to be fully effective on the international stage. Simeon notes that the federal government's power is "draining on the one hand to supra-national institutions and one the other to smaller local institutions (provinces) - the main federal levers have become more and more constrained." 41.

It appears likely that the provincial forays into international affairs and trade will increase in coming years.

As Grant Reuber observes the provinces are working counter to the need for a strong federal government voice in international markets. He asserts that "all signs point to a substantial decentralization of power from Ottawa to the provinces." 42.

From all of this, Canada can be seen as a federal nation which began with a strongly centralized vision but soon came to embark on a pronounced trend towards increased decentralization.

The decentralization trend was relatively constant, incurring interruptions during times of national crisis when the provinces would put their decentralizationist demands on hold for the duration of the emergency and, in the case of World War II, for an extended recovery period following the emergency.

However, we've also seen that in the absence of a unifying crisis or in the presence of a perceived federal failure such as the collapse of the Keynesian Compromise, the provinces' push for decentralization intensifies and that some degree of province-building still occurs even during those moments when the federal government manages to borrow centre stage.

The mere existence of provinces has been enough to ensure some degree of decentralist province-building efforts will take place. This reality is further sharpened by the presence of two very large provinces: Ontario, an economic giant; and Quebec, a predominantly French-speaking jurisdiction with many features of nation state an entrenched practice of pushing for greater powers to protect its distinct culture and set itself apart from the rest of Canada.

Garth Stevenson agrees with this bleak outlook for further decentralization, asserting that the degree to which Canada has already decentralized is unhealthy:

"...the picture that Canada presents to the outside world is that of an increasingly loose collection of semi-sovereign provinces, with a central government unable or unwilling to exercise much control over the economy or to carry out coherent policies even within its own fields of jurisdiction. Compared with almost any other modern state, or with Canada itself as recently as the 1950s, the extent of provincial power and the passivity of the central government are remarkable." 43.

As Stevenson concludes, Canada is today in a weakened position due to decentralization and a reversal of this trend may be needed to restore effectiveness to the nation's ability to function in the world:

"Canada is a relatively small, industrialized country in a world where most of its competitors are larger, stronger, and more centralized. If it is to survive in this environment and to overcome the divisive effects of its geographical barriers and its closeness to the United States, it may require a stronger central government that it has enjoyed in recent years and a corresponding reduction in the powers of provincial governments." 44.

Aided by landmark JCPC rulings and their own efforts, the provinces have achieved a degree of decentralization that I, and many political observers cited in this book, consider to be unhealthy for the viability of Canada as an independent nation state.

Given that Canada is today one of the most decentralized countries in the world, it remains to be seen if Canada's next federal government will demonstrate the desire, the will and the capacity to reverse the decentralization trend.

End Notes

1. Kenneth McNaught, The Penguin History of Canada, (Markham: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1988), pp. 134-136.

2. Webster's New World Dictionary, David B. Guralnik, Editor in Chief, (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1984), p. 231.

3. IBID, p. 365.

4. R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones & Donald B. Smith, Origins. Canadian History To Confederation, (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Canada, 1988), p. 378.

5. Craig Brown, 'The Nationalism of the National Policy,' from Readings in Canadian History. Post-Confederation, edited by R. Douglas Francis & Donald B. Smith, ( Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1990), p. 39.

6. R. Douglas Francis & Donald B. Smith, Readings in Canadian History. Pre- Confederation, (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1990), p. 504.

7. Roger Gibbons, Conflict & Unity, (Toronto: Nelson, 1990), p. 224.

8. R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones & Donald B. Smith, Destinies. Canadian History Since Confederation, (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada Ltd., 1988), pp. 7-8.

9. IBID, p. 8.

10. R. I. Cheffins & P.A. Johnson, The Revised Canadian Constitution, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1986), p. 119.

11. Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity, (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Company, 1989), p. 29.

12. R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones & Donald B. Smith, Destinies. Canadian History Since Confederation, (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1988), pp. 64-67.

13. J. Peter Meekison, 'The Amending Formula,' from Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, edited by R. D. Olling & M. W. Westmacott, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 68.

14. R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones & Donald B. Smith, Destinies. Canadian History Since Confederation, (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1988), p. 64.

15. IBID.

16. IBID, p. 8.

17. Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union. Canadian Federalism and National Unity, (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 46-47.

18. IBID, p. 49.

19. IBID, pp. 49-53.

20. Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union. Canadian Federalism and National Unity, (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Company, 1989), p. 47.

21. Alan C. Cairns, 'The Judicial Committee and Its Critics,' from Federalism in Canada. Selected Readings, edited by Garth Stevenson, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1989), pp. 94-96.

22. IBID, p. 95.

23. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism And The French Canadians, (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1968), p. 198.

24. Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, State, Society, and the Development of Canadian Federalism, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) pp. 56.

25. Roger Gibbons, Conflict & Unity, (Scarborough: Nelson, 1990), p.225.

26. Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, State, Society, and the Development of Canadian Federalism, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 56.

27. IBID, p. 61.

28. IBID, p. 90.

29. Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, State, Society, and the Development of Canadian Federalism, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 90.

30. Richard Simeon, 'Considerations on Centralization and Decentralization', from Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, edited by R. D. Olling and M. W. Westmacott, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1988), p. 370.

31. F. R. Scott, 'Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism,' from Federalism in Canada, edited by Garth Stevenson, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1989), p. 70.

32. Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence Le Duc & Jon H. Pammett, Absent Mandate, (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 14-16.

33. IBID.

34. IBID.

35. IBID

36. Richard Simeon, 'Considerations on Centralization and Decentralization', from Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, edited by R. D. Olling and M. W. Westmacott, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988), pp 370-374.

37. Janine Brodie, 'Tensions from Within: Regionalism and Party Politics in Canada', from Party Politics in Canada 6th Edition, edited by Hugh G. Thorburn, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1991), p. 231.

38. Reg Whitaker, 'The Overriding Right,' from Canadian Politics 91/92, edited by Gregory S. Mahler and Roman R. March, (Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin Publishing Group, 1991), p. 37.

39. Richard I. Cholewinski, Human Rights In Canada: Into the 1990s and Beyond, (Ottawa: Human Rights Research and Education Centre, 1990), p. 122.

40. Donald V. Smiley, The Federal Condition In Canada, (Toronto: McGrawHill Ryerson Ltd., 1987), p. 187.

41. Richard Simeon, 'Concluding Comments,' from Canadian Federalism: Meeting Global Economic Challenges?' edited by Douglas M. Brown and Murray G. Smith, (Kingston: Queen's University, 1991), p. 287.

42. Grant L. Reuber, 'Federalism and Negative-Sum Games' from Confederation In Crisis, edi

43. Garth Stevenson, 'Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations,' from Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 3rd Edition, edited: Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1990), pp. 397-398.

44. IBID, p. 39