We begin with a look at the Acadian expulsion, one of the most tragic episodes in Canadian history.
     The lesson in this chapter is that the Acadians felt they could remain neutral and stay oblivious to the dramatic political situation swirling around them. This proved to be their undoing.
     Had the Acadians been more politically aware (in fairness they were farmers in an age predating mass communications), they might have been more sensitive to the precarious situation the British faced concerning the threat from France and perhaps offered a pledge of allegiance to keep the Brits happy.
     Such a pledge might have stipulated their support would stop short of shooting at fellow Frenchmen but would include the provision of supplies and, perhaps, diplomatic efforts such a proclamation to the French to the effect that the Acadians were content being British subjects and did not need "rescuing."
     Instead, the Acadians assumed the British would accept their continued non-allegiance and allow them to carry on farming.
Yes, the British over-reacted. But it's unfortunate little heed was paid to the degree of discomfort the British felt at governing a foreign population - in an area prone to attack - that refused to align itself with the British. Having said that, it should be noted that today's Acadians are faring well.
     Although most of the original Acadians were exiled to Louisiana and elsewhere, some remained in Canada - or later returned here - and their descendents are now custodians of a vibrant and living culture.
     These Acadians pose no security threat to Canada: They are in fact Canadians, first and foremost. But these proud Canadian citizens are also proud of their Acadian heritage.
     Some of today's Acadians have preserved and restored - with assistance from Canada's federal government - Acadian pioneer villages, which offer visitors insight into early Canadian - as well as Acadian - history. In preserving Acadian culture they are adding to the fabric of Canada's culture. Far from being neutral bystanders, they're active members of Canadian society who retain a distinct identity that complements their Canadian identity.
     We next look at Walter Mondale's loss to Ronald Reagan in the 1984 American presidential race.
     The lesson the Democrats appear to have learned from Mondale's embarrassing defeat is that bland simply doesn't sell. Never has. Never will.
     So, the Democrats went searching for a charismatic, smooth, effective and engaging communicator - and found one in the form of one William Jefferson Clinton.
     A two-term president, Clinton has a legacy of substance and accomplishment (despite his trivial sex scandal).
We also revisited the Vietnam War - or at least the Hollywood versions of that horrific enterprise.
     To old adages come to mind: History repeats itself; and: Those who do not learn from mistakes of the past are condemned to repeat them.
Hopefully those adages will not apply to the United States which, going by its Vietnam movies, has learned little from that conflict and portrays it as a war almost won.
     And we'll examine the Ukrainian Holocaust, the Great Forced Famines that so crippled that nation. All of this and more can be found in the chapters ahead.
     - Michael B. Davie.

Chapter 1:
The Acadian Expulsion
An Unnecessary Measure

     The 1755 expulsion of the Acadians by the British is widely considered one of the most tragic episodes in Canadian history.
     American Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's 1847 poem 'Evangeline' and the song 'Acadian Driftwood by the 1960s-1970s Canadian rock group The Bank are just two examples of past and contemporary artistic works portraying the expulsion as a cruel and tragic act.
     While there is broad agreement that the British-ordered expulsion of thousands of French-speaking Acadians was lamentable, the question arises: Was it necessary?
     In my view, the 1755 expulsion of the Acadians was not necessary. I'll argue that it was an over-reaction on the part of Britain in response to security concerns arising from the military threat from France.
     I will show that there was substantial evidence, even at that time, to suggest the Acadians themselves did not pose any significant threat to Britain's efforts to control the region of Acadia in what is today the Canadian province of Nova Scotia.
     Acadia's troubles began in 1604, the moment France established Acadia, its first permanent settlement on the Atlantic coast of North America. The location itself proved to be a source of problems. As historian Douglas Francis, offering a brief synopsis, notes:
     "It's strategic location near the Gulf of St. Lawrence meant that England and France fought continually for its possession. The region changed hands frequently until 1713, when France ceded Acadia to England in the Treaty of Utrecht. For the next half-century, Britain ruled over the colony with its predominantly French-speaking and Roman Catholic population." 1.
     It was this frequent changing of hands regarding control of Acadia that led the Acadians to strive to offend neither warring power. In a further summarization of Acadia's situation, Francis adds:
     "The Acadians sought to remain neutral in conflicts between England and France. Initially this was possible, but with the construction of the large French fortress of Louisbourg during the 1720s on Cape Breton Island, and the founding of Halifax in 1749, the situation changed. With the revival of hostility between France and England in 1755, Nova Scotia's Lieutenant-Governor, Charles Lawrence, and his council at Halifax insisted that the Acadians take an unconditional oath of allegiance to the British Crown. When they refused, Lawrence expelled approximately 10,000 French Acadians." 2.
     The preceding summary sets our a few of the important dates and events that culminated in the expulsion of the Acadians (estimates vary from around 6,000 Acadians to the 10,000 figure Francis cites). The summary also provides us with a general framework of historical events, which we will now examine in more detail.
     Acadia began in 1604 as a tiny French community of around 80 people. The community was founded by Samuel de Champlain, Jean de Poutrincourt - and Pierre du Gua sieur De Monts, a Protestant merchant who was granted a 10-year fur trade monopoly for the region from Henri IV.
The King granted the monopoly on the understanding De Monts would establish a French colony of Catholics in the area of the Bay of Fundy. 3.
     After a disastrous first effort at Ile Saint-Croix in which half the settlers died from cold and scurvy, a second, successful attempt was made and the colony of Port Royal was established. 4.
     In his account of Acadian history, written more than a century ago, Acadian writer and former member of Canadian federal parliament Edouard Richard describes the very modest beginnings of Port Royal, a community that was built in a couple of months. The result was, for the most part, far from impressive. As Richard observes:
     "In the course of the following summer, a few dwelling-houses, a store and a palisade enclosing the whole were put up. Thus was Port Royal founded on the very site (now) occupied by the city of Annapolis." 5.
     Richard points out that while the fledgling colony was a fragile affair, it was still seen as a threat to neighbouring, larger colonies in New England.
     Reflecting on this situation, Richard offers this view of a struggling Acadia, already beginning to feel the presence of powerful neighbours:
     "Exposed as it was, this feeble colony, separated from Canada by vast distances and impenetrable forests, left to its own resources, without immigration, without assistance proportionate to the dangers of its situation, it was the theatre of perhaps greater vicissitudes of war than have fallen to the lot of any other county in the world."
6. Richard notes Acadia was continually caught between warring powers. He asserts that Acadia's location alone seemed to invite suspicion and hostility:
     "While on the one hand, it was, or might have been, highly useful to France, on the other, it was a constant menace to the commerce and tranquility of the English colonies. It is there that expeditions of adventurers were organized against the new England colonies; there too, attacks were made upon the French. It was a fine field for organizing, it was equally open to attack. Whether the two nations were at war or at peace, it was often war anyhow in these parts. A grievance or a mere pretext was enough to determine disastrous hostilities. Boston and Acadia sometimes waged war on each other on their own account, in spite of temporary peace and amity between the two crowns; and, what is more, on certain occasions, Acadia was the scene of prolonged hostilities between the Frenchmen who claimed the right to govern the country." 7.
     As fragile and vulnerable to attacks as Acadia was, it was also involved in limited expansionism in its early years.
     Another Acadian colony was established at the Ile des Monts Deserts (Mount Desert Island) in what is present-day Maine. Established in 1613, less than 10 years after the founding of Acadia itself, the young community survived only briefly.
     In July 1613, Virginian solider of fortune Samuel Argall destroyed the new colony, leaving most of its former inhabitants to return to France while a few resettled at Port Royal. 8.
     The Argall attack was just one example of numerous attacks to befall Acadia throughout its troubled history.
     As historian Naomi Griffiths has noted, Acadia existed within ill-defined boundaries between the expanding empires of New France and New England.
As Griffiths observes, the Acadians responded to this precarious situation be adopting the outlook of "border people" more interested in tending their farms than in dealing with political situations over which they had no control. 9.
     In 1621, England's territorial claim on Acadia - which it renamed Nova Scotia - began a long practice of Acadia changing hands between France and England with neither nation having much of an impact on the day-to-day lives of the Acadians who, even as late as the 1670s, numbered fewer than 500 people on peninsular Nova Scotia although tiny settlements would also be established on Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. 10.
     But the French were not the only nation influencing the course of Acadian history. As Griffiths notes: "By the end of the century, the Acadians had known one lengthy and legitimate period of English rule, 1654-1668, as well as a number of much shorter periods of English control as a result of raids out of Massachusetts." 11.
     The presence of French Acadians so close to the colonies of New England was a source of constant friction, particularly from an expansionist Massachusetts. It captured the Acadian capital of Port Royal in the 1670s via an expedition led by William Phipps. 12.
     John Clarence Webster, the late president of the Canadian Historical Association, suggests Massachusetts' capture of Port Royal was based on security concerns and was likely part of a boarder agenda: "Like the other American colonies, she was anxious about the growing power of France in Canada, and it was her ambition to carry out 'The Glorious Enterprise' proposed about this time by Peter Schuyler of Albany, which had for its aim the extermination of French authority on the continent." 13.
     In 1706, the Acadian capital of Port Royal, then under control of the French, came under the leadership of Governor Subercase during a period when animosity against Acadia was running high.
     Although the Acadians themselves were not known for widespread acts of piracy or warfare, they regularly supplied neighbouring bands of Indians with firearms that were used in raids on New England colonies. As historian James Hannay notes, the colonies not only blamed Acadia for these raids, but also for a series of raids originating from New France. 14.
     A force consisting of English and New England volunteers attacked Port Royal, unsuccessfully at first. But the joint forces subsequently captured Acadia in 1710, a victory, which exposed the poverty within the Acadian colony at a time when France was close to bankruptcy.
     The seizure of Acadia by England was officially recognized under the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. 15.
     Although the Treaty of Utrecht formally gave Acadia to England for all time, the Acadians themselves can be forgiven if they didn't appreciate the full significance of this historic document. As Griffiths notes: "By 1700, the Acadians were almost as accustomed to dealing with the officials of England as those of France. Thus the defeat of Subercase in 1710 and the subsequent transfer of the colony once more to English control by the Treaty of Utrecht, was, for the Acadians, yet another step in a complicated ritual, an exchange of control over them from France to England, something that had happened before… and something that would most probably be reversed in the not too distant future." 16.
     In fact, as Griffiths further observes, the transfer of Acadia between the leading powers of the day was a way of life in the little colony, although it was to have fatal consequences:
     "This fundamental belief in the mutability of power, this dominant sense of the probability of alternate French and English control of the colony, became the cornerstone of Acadian politics during the years 1713 to 1748. It was the basis for Acadian action to refuse requests made by the English officials that they swear an oath of allegiance to the King of England. From the Acadian viewpoint, it would have been folly indeed to engage in any action which would bind them irrevocably to one Great Power when the other was not only obviously in the neighbourhood, but more obviously still interested in the future status of the colony and its inhabitants. Thus the Acadians built a policy compounded of delay and compromise. The oath of George I was rejected outright. Later on, oaths were taken to George II. but in such circumstances as to enable Acadians to believe they had been granted the right to remain neutral."
17. Given Acadia's status as a tiny, underpopulated colony compared with its neighbours, and the Acadians' long history as a pawn passing between powerful nations, the people of Port Royal understandably wanted to avoid coming into direct conflict with far more powerful forces.

     As Griffiths points out, neutrality was Acadia's policy, borne of practical concerns:
     "However it might have looked to outsiders, the question of neutrality was serious enough to the Acadians. it was in fact a consistent policy that was first enunciated in 1717 by the Acadians of Annapolis Royal and later adhered to be them and others in time of war. On being asked for an oath of allegiance to George I, the response of Annapolis Royal (Port Royal) Acadians was a refusal, the reasons given being the matters of religious freedom were not yet clarified and danger from Indians, who were bound to disapprove of friendship between Acadian and English, led to fears for Acadian security. 'Never-the-less.' the response continued, 'we are ready to take an oath that we will take up arms neither against his Britannic Majesty nor against France, nor against their subjects or allies." 18.

     As American historian John Bartlett Brebner has pointed out, the practice of both the English and the French referring to Acadians from 1730 onward as 'les francais neutres' or 'the Neutral French' suggests that the neutrality of the Acadians was generally tolerated, if not warmly accepted, by English and French alike. 19.

     The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 changed the balance of power in North America by transferring the French territories of Hudson Bay, Newfoundland and Acadia to England.

     Yet it left present day Cape Breton Island and Prince Edward island in French hands, a provision which kept a door open for French expansionism in North America. France wasted little time in taking full advantage of the treaty to build the threatening fortress of Louisbourg. As historian James Hannay notes:
     "The way was thus left clear for France to erect new and powerful establishments on the very borders of Acadia and to retain for herself, the rich fisheries of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the political control of the coasts washed by the mighty sea. That was what France immediately proceeded to do. There on the shores of the English harbour began the erection of a great fortress, from which France might look forth and defy her enemies, the widely famed and potent Louisbourg." 20.

     Further complicating matters was the fourteenth article of the treaty, which allowed the Acadians freedom of religion, a measure used by the French to plant priest-agitators in the midst of Acadians to sow unrest. The treaty also contained a provision allowing the Acadians up to a year to leave with their possessions should they wish to leave the colony. 21.

     Historian Duncan Campbell describes post-treaty Acadia as a land fraught with problems for Britain which began to consider the possibility of removing the Catholic and French Acadians and thus end the difficulties inherent in governing a land where the inhabitants spoke a different language and practiced a different religion and also outnumbered the local British garrisons charged with keeping the peace in Acadia. British distrust of Acadians deepened with a refusal of Acadians to swear unconditional oaths of allegiance to Britain. 22.

     However, Campbell also notes that considerations of removing the French Acadians in 1717 and again in 1720 were stalled following strong arguments against such a move from former garrison commander Colonel Samuel Vetch and later from Acadian Governor Richard Philips.

     Neither man considered the Acadians a significant threat to security.

     Instead, both men expressed concerns that any large departure of Acadians would likely end up at Cape Breton Island where they would bolster the already strong French threat posed by Louisbourg.

     As well, the argued, a massive departure of Acadians and their livestock would crush the colony's economy, destroy the local fur trade and disrupt sources of food and labour needed to sustain the British garrison. 23.

     In fact, when a number of Acadian families decided to leave Acadia during the first year of the treaty, Governor Philips came up with a range of obstacles intended to keep them in Acadia - such as not allowing them to depart on British vessels - so that they would continue farming the rich lands they had reclaimed from the sea. To accommodate the Acadians, Philips allowed them to swear an oath of non-aggression - not allegiance - regarding Britain. 24.

     Griffiths points out that for the most part, the majority of Acadians were neutral and resisted the constant efforts of the nearby French at Louisbourg and invitations from French priests (often suspected of being French agent-agitators) to take up arms against the British or play some other active role in removing the British from Acadia.

     Instead, the Acadians continued to walk the tightrope of neutrality. This neutrality worked not only to the advantage of the Acadians, but also to the advantage at times of the English governors of the colony. For example, Griffiths recounts this episode involving Lieutenant-Governor Paul Mascarene's gratitude towards a majority of Acadians who refused to take part in French attacks on the British at Acadia:
"In 1744 when hostilities broke out between English and French in North America, Mascarene, then the lieutenant-governor of the colony, wrote to his masters in London: 'These latter (i.e., the French inhabitants) have given me assurances of their resolution to keep in their fidelity to his Majesty'. Mascarene was convinced that had the Acadians not remained neutral during the hospitalities, the colony would have fallen to the French." 25.

     Simply put, the Acadians themselves were instrumental in keeping Acadia in British hands. Griffiths adds: "There is no doubt that between 1713 and 1748, the majority of Acadians strove to live on their land truly as neutrals, giving loyalty to neither French nor English. This policy procured for their communities nearly thirty-five years of peace, but its final failure in 1755 has overshadowed its earlier success. it was a policy that produced peace and quiet for the Acadian communities, however catastrophic it finally proved to be." 26.

     In 1748, however, the Acadians' situation changed for the worse.

     The Treaty of Aux-la-Chapelle ended hostilities between France and Britain.

     But it returned to the French, the fortress of Louisbourg, which had been captured by a band of New Englanders in 1745.

     The return of the French fortress revived an old threat and inflamed security concerns of New Englanders, prompting Governor Shirley of Massachusetts to call for the removal of the French influence in the area. In particular, Shirley called for the expulsion of Acadians and their replacement by British immigrants. 27.

     In 1749, the British founded Halifax, made it the capital of Nova Scotia and immediately sent 2,000 immigrants from England and New England to populate it. An additional 1,500 immigrants from Germany soon followed, giving the British an overnight population of hand-picked citizens that was nearly half the population of the Acadians who numbered 8,000 in 1749.

     Governor Cornwallis demanded an oath of allegiance fro the Acadians but did not press the matter when they refused. His successor, Governor Hopson, did not ask for the oath and Acadians remained neutral. 28.

     At this point, let me suggest that any remaining perceived threat from Acadians could have been erased in short order by allowing additional waves on non-Acadian immigration to take place, giving the British an overwhelming numerical advantage.

     But although further immigration did indeed take place, peaceful coexistence with the Acadians was not to be: In 1753, Charles Lawrence was appointed governor and he envisioned a Nova Scotia that was capable of surviving and thriving without Acadians.

     Lawrence was actively considering expelling the Acadians when hostilities broke out between England and France in 1754 and British forces succeeded in capturing the French fort Beausejour. 29. Then, in 1755, Lawrence ordered the Acadians to swear an oath of unconditional allegiance to England.

     When most Acadians predictably refused to take the oath, Lawrence ordered all Acadians - including those who did take the oath - deported. Thousands of Acadians were loaded onto waiting boats and taken to pre-arranged destinations - such as Louisiana - during the years 1755 to 1763. 30.

     Historian Francis Parkman, writing in 1884, offers a rare view I have not encountered elsewhere: He suggests Lawrence had little choice but to expel the Acadians. Parkman would have us believe: "Whatever judgement may be passed on the cruel measure of wholesale expatriation, it was not put into execution till every resource of patience and persuasion had been tried in vain." 31.

     This brief assertion has been strongly rejected, not only by myself, but by a number of prominent historians, including Richard, who notes Parkman has overlooked a number of important historical documents along with evidence showing that the vast majority of Acadians had never taken up arms against the British - even when it would have been to their possible advantage to do so. This recalls the Acadians' refusal to aid the French against Mascarene when such assistance would have likely ousted the British from Acadia.

     Richard also notes the Acadians willingly turned over their weapons to the British, who were surprised to find more than 2,000 hunting rifles in their midst. Richard asks:
     "What was to be feared now that they were deprived of them and that surrender of these arms had been effected without resistance, everywhere, upon a mere command? How could they be dangerous when their boats had been confiscated and when the French had been expelled from al of their strongholds on the coast? Let Mr. Parkman answer this question, he, who in order to prejudge the matter, has not so much as alluded to the seizure of arms and boats, he who has carefully eschewed whatever could throw light on this ignoble tragedy." 32.

     Richard also draws attention to the governor's own correspondence in which he indicates that plans for an expulsion had been well developed for some time in advance of the oath-ultimatum being given. In other letters, Lawrence expresses doubts the Acadians would ever take up arms against the British.

     Yet Lawrence also expresses hope the Acadians will refuse to take the oath so he can deport them. 33.

     Historian W. J. Eccles notes the expulsion is particularly controversial because it took place after the British had captured Fort Beausejour at the foot of the Bay of Fundy and thus had removed the French threat in Nova Scotia.

     Eccles also suggests the severity of the fate dealt the Acadians only served to galvanize French resistance in Quebec, making the French there determined to fight hard to prevent a similar fate from ever befalling them. 34.

     Historian George Frederick Clark, similarly suggests the expulsion wasn't necessary and indicates the decision had a lot to do with the character of Lawrence, a poorly educated and widely disliked man who rose from humble beginnings to hold the a position requiring a degree of sensitivity and statesmanship he simply did not possess. Clark notes Lawrence was hated, not just by the Acadians, but by many in Halifax who devoted passages of their correspondence to describing Lawrence's arrogant nature, his vile disposition and his inability to tolerate anyone who opinion differed from his own.

     As well, Clark observes Lawrence had stated beliefs to the effect that the Acadians posed no real threat.

     Finally, there is the complete lack of any statement of sympathy or empathy by Lawrence toward the Acadians, before, during or after their expulsion, which Clark suspects was a decision driven largely by Lawrence's vile nature. 35.

     Whether the decision to expel thousands of Acadians was largely driven by any perverse nature on the part of a former governor is open to interpretation.

     My own reading of this situation is that Lawrence's nature did indeed play a major role in the expulsion.

     However, what the evidence cited throughout this essay makes abundantly clear is that the decision itself was not necessary.

     As demonstrated, based on the works of various prominent historians, the vast majority of Acadians had peacefully co-existed with the British for many decades and only a small minority of Acadians had ever resorted to any form of armed resistance or provided any assistance and arms to enemies of the British.

Considering that the Acadians were French-speaking Catholics with relatives in New France and France, the neutrality they offered the British was likely the best possible arrangement the British could have hoped for.

The Acadians could not have reasonably been expected to take up arms against their own French kin.

Instead, the Acadians offered - and kept - assurances that they would fight neither British nor French.

This neutrality was accepted and appreciated by more than one governor, especially Mascarene, who openly admitted the colony would have been captured by the French during his tenure had the Acadians broken their neutrality to side with the French.

Indeed, throughout much of their co-existence with the British, the Acadians could have presented a threat if they had wanted to do so.

The Acadians came to number in the thousands and were well stocked with more than enough rifles to conquer the small British garrison of around 200 men who presided over Acadia for decades.

Instead, the Acadians largely preferred to farm their lands in peace.

Evidence cited by historians indicates the expulsion was an unnecessary, pre-meditated act, which used the excuse of a refused oath to justify its execution.

Of course, the Acadians had refused similar unconditional oaths in the past and this position of neutrality had always been accepted.

As Clarke notes, Lawrence was actually expecting - even hoping - the Acadians would give him the excuse he needed to expel them.

The Acadians, who had for years resisted French efforts to entice them to attack the British, were expelled at a time when they presented so threat at all to the British.

The region was controlled from its new capital of Halifax and rapid waves of British immigration were beginning to rival the Acadians as the dominant population in Nova Scotia. Given a short period of time, it was likely the British in Nova Scotia would have enjoyed numerical superiority over the Acadians thus removing any threat from a people who had never presented a threat - even when they dominated the landscape.

With Britain having emerged victorious from the 1750s hostilities and having captured all French forts in peninsular Nova Scotia, Britain also removed a source of French agitators - who'd never successfully enticed the Acadians to attack the British.

Of course, the minority of Acadians who were guilty of crimes against the British could have been dealt with judiciously without Lawrence ever having to expel the entire, largely peaceful population (including those who had taken the oath of allegiance).

The Acadians' lengthy, peaceful history of non-violent coexistence with the British, their refusal to accept French invitations and threats to attack the British, their role as a supplier of food and labour to a vulnerable garrison, their honoured pledges of neutrality, their refusal to use their thousands of guns against the British and their acceptance of British rule combined with Britain's eventual position of extreme dominance in the region of New England, northward, all lead to the inescapable conclusion that the expulsion simply wasn't necessary.

That the expulsion took place was enough to render the Acadians political losers. However, it should be noted that the expelled Acadians simply went on to enrich the culture of Louisiana (while impoverishing Canada's culture).

It should also be noted that the ascendants of the expelled Acadians have found a way to preserve their old culture - and contribute to Canada's overall culture - and that these loyal Canadians pose no threat whatsoever to Canada. Acadia lives on today as a valued region of Canada.

End Notes

1. Francis, Douglas R., and Donald B., Readings in Canadian History: Pre Confederation, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1990. p. 147.
2. IBID
3. Daigle, Jean, Historical Synthesis: 1604-1763. The Acadians of the Maritimes, Centre d'etudes acadiennes, Moncton, NB, 1982.p. 32
4. IBID
5. Richard, Edouard, Acadia: Missing Links of a Lost Chapter in American history, New York Home Book Company, John Lovell and Son, Montreal, 1985. p. 27.
6. IBID
7. IBID
8. Daigle, Jean, Historical Synthesis: 1604-1763. The Acadians of the Maritimes, Centre d'etudes acadiennes, Moncton, NB, 1982. p. 20
9. Griffiths, Naomi, E.S., The Acadian Deportation: Deliberate Perfidy or Cruel Necessity?, Copp Clark Publishing Co., Toronto, 1969. p. 2.
10. IBID
11. Griffiths, Naomi, E.S., The Golden Age: Acadian Life, 1713-1748, Social History 17, 33 (May 1984) pp. 21-34.
12. Webster, John Clarence, Acadia and the End of the Seventeenth Century, Tribune Press, Sackville, NB, '34. p.2
13. IBID
14. Hannay, James, The History of Acadia from its First Discovery to its Surrender to England, J&A McMillan, St. John, NB, 1879. pp 265-269.
15. IBID pp 269-281.
16. Griffiths, Naomi, E.S., The Golden Age: Acadian Life, 1713-1748, Social History 17, 33 (May 1984) pp. 21-34.
17. IBID
18. IBID
19. Brebner, J.B,, New England's Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest of Canada, New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. pp 15-16.
20. Hannay, James, The History of Acadia from its First Discovery to its Surrender to England, J&A McMillan, St. John, NB, 1879. p. 307.
21. IBID p. 308.
22. Campbell, Duncan, Nova Scotia and its Historical, Mercantile and Industrial Relations, Montreal, John Lovell and Sons, 1873. pp 73-80.
23. IBID
24. IBID
25. Griffiths, Naomi, E.S., The Golden Age: Acadian Life, 1713-1748, Social History 17, 33 (May 1984) pp. 21-34.
26. IBID
27. Daigle, Jean, Historical Synthesis: 1604-1763. The Acadians of the Maritimes, Centre d'etudes acadiennes, Moncton, NB 1982. 44-46
28. IBID
29. IBID
30. IBID
31. An excerpt from The Acadian Deportation, N. E. S. Griffiths, Copp Clark, 1969. p. 6.
32. Richard, Edouard, Acadia: Missing Links of a Lost Chapter in American history, New York Home Book Company, John Lovell and Son, Montreal, 1985. pp 30-31.
33. IBID
34. Eccles, W. J., France in America, Harper and Row, 1972, p 17.
35. Clarke, George Frederick, Expulsion of the Acadians, Brunswick Press, Fredericton, NB, 1955. pp 21-27.